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Abstract: We examine the effects that variations in the international food 
prices have on democracy and intra-state conflict using panel data for over 
120 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that in 
Low Income Countries increases in the international food prices lead to a 
significant   deterioration   of   democratic   institutions   and   a   significant 
increase in the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and 
civil conflict. In the High Income Countries variations in the international 
food prices have no significant effects on democratic institutions and 
measures of intra-state conflict. Our empirical results point to a significant 
externality of variations in international food prices on Low Income 
Countries' social and political stability.
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11. Introduction
It is often claimed by policy makers and the media that increases in international food prices put at 
stake the intra-state stability of the world's poorest countries. World Bank's President Zoellick for 
example claimed at the joint World-Bank IMF 2008 spring meeting that a drastic increase in food 
prices could mean "seven lost years" in the fight against worldwide poverty. At the same conference 
IMF's managing director Strauss-Kahn expressed that "... the consequences [of food price increases] 
on the population in a large set of countries ... will be terrible ... disruptions may occur in the 
economic environment ... so that at the end of the day most governments, having done well during 
the last five or 10 years, will see what they have done totally destroyed, and their legitimacy facing 
the population destroyed also."
1 The question of how and whether variations in the international 
food prices affect the intra-state stability of the world's poorest countries is therefore of clear policy 
relevance. Yet, little formal empirical evidence exists on the link between food prices and political 
and social instability. 
In this paper we make an attempt to close this gap. We construct a country-specific food 
price index that is driven by the variation in the international food prices for a panel of over 120 
countries during the 1970-2007 period. We use rigorous panel data techniques that account for both 
unobservable cross-country heterogeneity and common year shocks, and we identify the effects that 
international food price variations have on political and social stability from the within-country 
variation of the data. 
Our first main finding is that increases in the international food prices lead to a significant 
deterioration of democratic institutions in the Low Income Countries. A one standard deviation 
increase in the international food price index significantly reduced Low Income Countries' polity 
score by about 0.03 standard deviations on average. We document that this result is robust to 
different measures of democracy, time periods, and estimation strategies. 
To provide an explanation for the adverse effects of food price increases on Low Income 
1 http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/04/14/world.food.crisis/
2Countries' political institutions we document that food price increases significantly increase the 
incidence of intra-state conflict. In particular, we show that for the Low Income Countries increases 
in   the   international   food   prices   significantly   increase   the   incidence   of   anti-government 
demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. In the High Income Countries, where the incidence of anti-
government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict is relatively low, increases in the international 
food prices did not have a significant effect on intra-state stability. International food price 
increases also did not significantly affect these countries' political institutions. Our empirical 
analysis therefore yields that the world's poorest countries, that arguably are the least responsible 
for changes in the international food prices, are strongest hit.
Beyond informing the policy debate on the socio-economic effects of food price increases, 
our empirical results shed novel insights on the academic debate on the effects of economics shocks 
on political institutions. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2006) develop a formal theory of 
democratic transitions where transitory economic shocks can give rise to a democratic window of 
opportunity. Recent empirical evidence by Bruckner and Ciccone (2010b) and Burke and Leigh 
(2010) on the effects of rainfall shocks on democratic change in Africa has provided supportive 
empirical evidence for the Acemoglu and Robinson theory. Our paper complements these empirical 
studies by showing that externally driven changes in the international food prices significantly 
affect the likelihood of democratic change in the Low Income Countries. Our empirical results are 
broadly consistent with case study evidence such as Berger and Spoerer (2001) that show that food 
riots can induce significant political change. 
Our paper is also related to the literature on the determinants of state fragility. A large part 
of this literature has focused on civil war. This particular focus on civil war is understandable as 
these type of intra-state conflicts have killed and maimed millions of people (e.g. World Bank, 
2003). We complement this conflict literature by focusing on the effects that food prices have on 
civil conflict risk – a focus that to the best of our knowledge is unique, as no paper has examined 
3yet exclusively for food commodities the effects that variations in these international prices have on 
civil conflict risk.
2 In addition to shedding novel light on the question of how international food 
price variations affect the likelihood of civil conflict in the world's poorest countries, we also 
examine more minor forms of intra-state instability, such as anti-government demonstrations and 
riots, which are of considerable interest in and of themselves from a political economy point of 
view. 
Finally our paper contributes to the literature on food insecurity. One of the issues that this 
literature is well aware of but struggling with, is that actual food production is endogenous to civil 
conflict and democratic change. Country examples indicate that the presence of civil war is 
associated with an increase in domestic food prices. For example, in Darfur prices of the main food 
staples increased rapidly after widespread violence started in late 2003/early 2004 (see e.g. 
Brinkman and Hendrix, 2010). If this is indeed systematically the case across country-periods, then 
using domestic food prices to estimate the average effect that higher food prices have on civil war 
will be complicated by a positive simultaneity bias. Our paper seeks to make a  contribution to this 
literature on food insecurity by using variations in the international food prices -- which are for 
most Low Income Countries a plausibly exogenous source of variation in food expenditures -- to 
examine the effects that changes in food prices have on intra-state conflict and political institutions 
in the developing world.
The remainder of the paper is organized as followed. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
discusses the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 presents further 
robustness checks. And Section 6 concludes.
2 Most closely related to our analysis on conflict is the paper by Bruckner and Ciccone (2010a) who show for Sub-
Saharan African countries that increases in a commodity export price index significantly reduce the risk of civil war. 
The main difference between our paper and Bruckner and Ciccone (2010a) is that Bruckner and Ciccone focus on a 
general commodity export price index (mineral and agricultural goods) and that they do not focus on the exclusive 
effects that food prices have on civil war.
42. Data 
Food Price Index. We construct a country-specific international food price index as: 
where FoodPricec,t is the international price of food commodity c in year t, and θi,c is the average 
(time-invariant) value of net-exports of food commodity c in the GDP of country i. It is important to 
note that our index weights the international commodity prices by the country-specific net export 
GDP shares. This weighting scheme ensures that we take into account that, for an exporter an 
increase in the price of the exported commodity good carries a positive wealth effect while for an 
importer it carries a negative wealth effect. We use the average rather than the year-to-year 
variation in the net export share in order to reduce concerns that food exports and imports as a share 
of GDP are endogenous to year-to-year changes in countries' socio-political environment. We also 
note that the exponential form of the food price index can be motivated by log-linearizing GDP and 
taking total differentials with respect to the food prices. This yields that the log-change in GDP 
should be related to the log-changes in the food prices weighted by the steady state shares of the net 
food exports in GDP. 
We obtain data on annual international food prices for the 1970-2007 period from UNCTAD 
Commodity Statistics. Our data on the value of net food exports are from the NBER-United Nations 
Trade Database. The food commodities included in our food price index are beef, maize, rice, sugar, 
and wheat. In case there were multiple prices listed for the same commodity we used a simple 
average of all the relevant prices.
Measures of Democracy and Intra-State Conflict.  Democracy is measured by the revised 
combined Polity score (Polity2) of the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2009). The Polity2 
score ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values indicating more democratic institutions. Following 
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q(autocracies) if their Polity2 score is strictly positive (negative). We further classify countries as 
deep democracies if their Polity2 score is larger than 6; and as deep autocracies if their Polity2 
score is smaller than -6. To examine also specifically the political competition and executive 
constraints channel, we  use the polity sub-scores on constraints on the chief executive and political 
competition. According to the Polity IV project, constraints on the executive is a measure of the 
extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief executives and ranges 
from 1 to 7, with greater values indicating tighter constraints. Political competition measures the 
extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political 
arena. This indicator ranges from 1 to 10, with greater values denoting more competition. 
Our main measure of intra-state instability is a civil conflict indicator variable that is equal 
to unity if the country experienced a civil conflict (i.e. an intra-state conflict that incurred more than 
25 battle deaths, as recorded by the PRIO UPSALLA 2010 database). We also consider more minor 
forms of intra-state instability such riots and anti-government demonstrations by using data from 
Banks (2010) on the number of riots and anti-government demonstrations.
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the Low Income Group is characterized by low average 
democracy scores, and a high incidence of civil conflict. The mean Polity2 score is -2.4 and the 
mean incidence of civil conflict is 0.25 for the Low Income Group; for the Middle and High Income 
Group the mean Polity2 scores are 2.3 and 4.7 respectively and the mean incidence of civil conflict 
are 0.14 and 0.07. While certainly this does not imply causality, it is interesting to note that in the 
Middle and High Income Group the average democracy score is much higher, and the incidence of 
civil conflict is much lower than in the Low Income Group (e.g. World Bank, 2003). 
3. Estimation Strategy
To examine the effects that changes in the international food prices have on democratic institutions 
and other key variables of interest, we estimate the following econometric model:
6where αi are country fixed effects that capture time-invariant country-specific unobservables and βt 
are year fixed effects that capture common year shocks. ui,t is an error term that is clustered at the 
country level. As a baseline regression, we estimate the average marginal effect that food price 
fluctuations have on democracy (and other outcomes of interest) in the Low Income Countries 
sample.
3 We restrict our baseline analysis to the Low Income Group (as defined by WDI 2010) as 
these are precisely the kind of countries where a large share of the population lives in extreme 
poverty. As an identification check on our main premise that food price changes have particularly 
large effects on political and social stability in poor countries, we repeat our regressions when 
restricting the sample to the Middle and High Income Countries.
 
4. Main Results
Table 2 presents our estimates of the average marginal effect that food price changes have on 
democracy in the Low Income Countries. Column (1) shows estimates where the within-country 
change in countries' Polity2 score is related to the within-country change in countries' food price 
index. Column (2) adds to this regression country fixed effects and column (3) adds year fixed 
effects. The main result is a negative and highly significant effect of food price increases on the 
Polity2 score. Quantitatively, the estimated coefficient implies that on average a one standard 
deviation increase in the food price index significantly reduced the Polity2 score by about 0.03 
standard deviations in the Low Income Countries.
4 
In column (4) we add lags of the food price index to check whether there are significant 
lagged   effects   of   food   price   increases   on   the   countries'   democracy   scores.   The   estimated 
coefficients on the lagged food price index are negative, thus indicating that even after several 
periods an increase in the food price index induces a negative effect on the polity score. However, 
3 The group of Low Income Countries is identified using the WDI (2010) classification scheme.  
4 The standard deviation of the log-change in the food price index is 0.004; the standard deviation of the change in the 
Polity2 score is 1.99.
7
t i t i t i t i u FoodPI Polity , , , ) ( ) ( + D + + = D g b astatistically these lagged effects are not significant at conventional confidence levels. Hence, we 
note that the main negative effect on the polity score from food price increases is on impact.
To take into account dynamics in countries' polity score, we show in columns (5) and (6) 
dynamic panel estimates that include on the right-hand side of the estimating equation the lagged 
level of polity score. Both the least squares and system-GMM estimates show that there is quite a 
bit of persistence in the dynamics of the polity score. The estimated convergence coefficient is -0.13 
and implies a half-life in shocks to the level of the polity score of around 4 years. Most importantly, 
the dynamic panel data estimates confirm that there is a significant negative impact effect of food 
price increases on the polity score. 
In Table 3 we document that our finding of a negative effect of food price increases on 
political institutions in the Low Income Countries is robust to the use of alternative democracy 
measures. In column (1) we present results when using the Polity2 score that excludes periods of 
interregnum and transition.
5  Columns (2) and (3) present results for the polity sub-scores on 
executive constraints and political competition, and in column (4) and (5) we present the results for 
the democracy and autocracy score.
6  We find that regardless of which measure is used our main 
result survives: increases in the international food prices lead to a significant deterioration of 
political institutions in Low Income Countries. 
As an intermediate step to explain the adverse effects of food price increases on political 
institutions in Low Income Countries, we document the effects that food price increases have on 
these countries' macroeconomies. In column (1) we show that increases in food prices lead to 
significant increases in GDP per capita. This is primarily due to the terms of trade effect that raises 
the return to capital and hence investment in the net food exporting countries (see column (2)).
7 In 
5 These periods are coded in the executive constraints and political competition sub-scores as -77,-88,-66. The revised 
combined Polity2 score integrates these values be assigning interregnum periods the value of zero; and linearly 
interpolating transition periods. 
6 Both the democracy and autocarcy score range between 0 and 10, with higher values indicating more democracy 
(autocracy). 
7 Recall that our estimates identify the effects of food price increases by weighting the (log)-change of the food price 
by the net export share in GDP. This weighting scheme takes into account that for a food exporter an increase in the 
international food price is a positive terms-of-trade shock. See also Section 2 for further discussion.
8column (3) we show that beyond the significant increase in private investment, real per capita 
government expenditures also increased significantly. On the other hand, column (4) documents 
that private consumption decreased. Given that food expenditures constitute a large share of total 
consumption expenditures in the Low Income Countries the significant decrease in private 
consumption should not be surprising. However, the significant decrease in private consumption 
also indicates that beyond their average effect on income per capita food price increases may carry 
important distributional and compositional effects. Indeed, column (5) shows that even with the 
relatively sparse panel data that are available for Low Income Countries on income inequality, 
higher food prices induced significant increases in the Low Income Countries' Gini coefficients.
8 
This suggests that food price increases induced an increase in the gap of income between the rich 
and the poor, thus increasing relative deprivation.
In Table 5 we examine the effects that food prices have on intra-state conflicts. In column 
(1) we report the effect that food price changes have on the number  of anti-government 
demonstrations and in column (2) we report the effect that food price changes have on the number 
of riots. Our main finding is that increases in food prices significantly increase both the number of 
anti-government demonstrations and the number of riots. The estimates in columns (2) and (3) 
imply that on average a one standard deviation increase in the food price index increased the 
number of anti-government demonstrations and riots by about 0.01 standard deviations. We also 
document in column (3) that there is a significant increase in the risk of expropriation, as measured 
by the Political Risk Service (PRS) expropriation score. Finally, columns (4) and (5) show that 
higher food prices significantly increase the incidence of civil conflict.
9 Table 5 therefore resonates 
the common held view in the conflict literature that economic shocks are a significant determinant 
of intra-state conflicts (e.g. Miguel et al., 2004; Bruckner and Ciccone 2010a).
8 The data on Gini coefficients is obtained from the United Nations WIDER (2008) database.
9 We  present in column (5) conditional logit fixed effects estimates to take into account the binary nature of the 
dependent variable. Note that these estimates do not represent marginal effects because this would require 
knowledge of the distribution of the country fixed effects (e.g. Wooldridge, 2002).
95. Robustness Checks 
In Tables 6-8 we report a number of robustness checks to strengthen our results. In Table 6 we 
show that there continues to be a significant effect of food prices on measures of intra-state conflict 
when excluding the (few) Low Income Countries that are large food suppliers to the world food 
market.
10 The identifying assumption in the previous tables was that Low Income Countries are 
price takers on the international food market. This seems a plausible assumption for the majority of 
the Low Income Countries, as these countries produce and consume individually only a very small 
fraction of world food production. Thus, the fact that there continues to be a highly significant 
effect of food prices on measures of intra-state conflict when excluding potentially large food 
producing countries from the Low Income Countries sample is reassuring that our baseline 
assumption of international food prices being exogenous is reasonable. 
A further interesting issue that we are able to examine with our panel data is whether the 
relationship between food prices and intra-state conflict has changed over time. One particular 
difference in the relationship could have occurred due to the end of the Cold War (see also Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003). In Table 7 we check this by reporting estimates from an interaction model where 
the marginal effect of food prices on intra-state conflict is allowed to differ for the pre- and the post-
1990 period. Our main finding from these interaction regressions is that (i) there is a significant 
positive average effect of food prices on intra-state conflict for the pre-1990 period; and (ii) there is 
some evidence that for the post-1990 period the effect of food price changes on intra-state conflict 
has become significantly larger (see e.g. columns (1) or (3)). 
As a further check on our identification, we report in Table 8 estimates of the effects that 
changes in the international food prices have on the incidence of intra-state conflicts in the High 
Income and Middle Income Countries. One of the key characteristics that distinguishes the Low 
Income Countries from the High and Middle Income Countries is the large number of people who 
10 The excluded countries are China, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, 
Vietnam. These Low Income Countries produce a significant (more than 3 percent) share of world food production 
and might therefore have an effect on world food prices. 
10live in extreme poverty. Food expenditures constitute a large share of the consumption basket for 
the extremely poor, and it are precisely these people -- the poor -- where food price increases bear 
the most dire consequences. Not surprising therefore, Table 8 shows that food price increases did 
not lead to a significant increase in the incidence of intra-state conflicts in the High Income and 
Middle Income Countries.  
6. Conclusion
We examined in this paper empirically the effects that changes in the international food prices have 
on measures of democracy and intra-state stability in a panel of over 120 countries during the period 
1970-2007. Our main finding was that during times of international food price increases political 
institutions in Low Income Countries significantly deteriorated. To explain this finding we 
documented  that food price increases in Low Income Countries significantly increased the 
likelihood of civil conflict and other forms of civil strife, such as anti-government demonstrations 
and riots. 
From the macroeconomic perspective it is worthwhile to restate that international food price 
increases induced in the net food exporting countries a significant increase in real per capita GDP 
and real per capita investment (the terms of trade effect). At the same time, international food price 
increases induced a significant decrease in real per capita consumption and a significant increase in 
income inequality. Thus, increases in the international food prices had real macroeconomic effects 
that went beyond average per capita income: they were associated with a significant decrease in 
consumption and a significant increase in the gap between rich and poor. 
All in all, our empirical results are broadly consistent with the often made claim by policy 
makers and the press that food price increases put at stake the socio-economic and political stability 
of the world's poorest countries. Arguably a large share of the variation in the international food 
prices is due to changes in the demand and supply of the High and Middle Income Countries. A 
11natural question that arises therefore is what can and should be done by the developed world and 
international organizations in response to drastic increases in international food prices. We conclude 
here by noting however that this is a normative question, that we cannot answer with our empirical 
research design (which is positive in nature). A discussion of what should be done in response to 
international food price increases must thus be left outside this paper.
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13Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Panel A: Low Income Countries
Polity2 -2.42 6.02 2676
Executive Constraints 3.76 3.01 2544
Political Competition 3.07 1.91 2544
GDP Per Capita (PWt 6.3) 2444 1739 2627
Gini 0.42 0.10 423
Riots 0.48 1.43 2642
Anti-Government Demonstrations 0.45 1.75 2642
Civil Conflict 0.25 0.43 2676
Panel B: Upper Middle Income Countries
Polity2 2.34 6.89 1106
Executive Constraints 5.92 3.55 1077
Political Competition 4.57 2.23 1077
GDP Per Capita (PWt 6.3) 8002 5041 1122
Gini 0.43 0.11 373
Riots 0.77 1.96 1171
Anti-Government Demonstrations 0.59 1.77 1170
Civil Conflict 0.14 0.35 1269
Panel C: High Income Countries
Polity2 4.74 7.89 1435
Executive Constraints 7.40 3.88 1421
Political Competition 5.42 2.36 1421
GDP Per Capita (PWt 6.3) 20687 12077 1372
Gini 0.28 0.06 459
Riots 0.79 2.84 1384
Anti-Government Demonstrations 0.56 2.60 1384
Civil Conflict 0.06 0.24 1435
14Table 2. Food Prices and Political Institutions
Polity2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





















Country Fe No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2676 2676 2676 2589 2676 2676
Countries 61 61 61 61 61 61
Note: The method of estimation in columns (1)-(5) is least squares; column (6) system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The t-values shown in 
parentheses below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable is the 
change in the Polity2 score. The explanatory variable is the log-change in the food price index. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent 
confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
Table 3. Food Prices and Political Institutions
(Alternative Measures)
       Polity        Exconst        Polcomp             Democ  Autoc











Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 2496 2496 2496 2496 2496
Observations 61 61 61 61 61
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. t-values shown in parentheses below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the Polity score; column (2) the change in the executive 
constraints score; column (3) the change in the political competition score; column (3) the change in the democracy score; column (5) the change in 
the autocracy score. All scores exclude values that are recorded as -66, -77, and -88. The explanatory variable is the log-change in the food price 
index. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
15Table 4. Food Prices and Macroeconomic Outcomes
     GDP                       Inv                         Gov              Cons    Gini











Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 2444 2444 2444 2444 411
Observations 61 61 61 61 57
Note: The method of estimation is least squares. t-values shown in parentheses below the point estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors 
that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the log-change in real per capita GDP; column (2) the log-change in 
real per capita investment; column (3) the log-change in real per capita government expenditures; column (4) the log-change in real per capita private 
consumption. The explanatory variable is the log-change in the food price index. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 
percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
Table 5. Food Prices and Intra-State Conflict
                      Demonstrations     Riots                 Expropriation                            Civil Conflict             
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 2450 2450 1059 2450 2450
Observations 61 61 53 61 61
Note: The method of estimation in column (1)-(4) is least squares; column (5) maximum likelihood. t-values shown in parentheses below the point 
estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the 
number of anti-government demonstrations; column (2) the change in the number of riots; column (3) the change in the Political Risk Service 
Expropriation score (the score is re-scaled so that higher values denote a higher risk of expropriation); column (4) and (5) and indicator variable that 
is equal to unity if the country experienced a civil conflict. The explanatory variable is the log-change in the food price index. *Significantly different 
from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
16Table 6. Robustness Check I: Excluding Large Food Producers
                      Demonstrations     Riots                 Expropriation                            Civil Conflict             
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)











Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 2060 2060 877 2102 2102
Observations 51 51 44 51 51
Note: The method of estimation in column (1)-(4) is least squares; column (5) maximum likelihood. t-values shown in parentheses below the point 
estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the 
number of anti-government demonstrations; column (2) the change in the number of riots; column (3) the change in the Political Risk Service 
Expropriation score (the score is re-scaled so that higher values denote a higher risk of expropriation); column (4) and (5) and indicator variable that 
is equal to unity if the country experienced a civil conflict. The explanatory variable is the log-change in the food price index. The excluded large 
food producing countries for the Low Income Group are China, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Pakistan, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, and 
Vietnam. *Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
Table 7. Robustness Check II: Are the Post-1990s Different?
                      Demonstrations     Riots                 Expropriation                            Civil Conflict             
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)





















Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 2450 2450 1059 2450 2450
Observations 61 61 53 61 61
Note: The method of estimation in column (1)-(4) is least squares; column (5) maximum likelihood. t-values shown in parentheses below the point 
estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the 
number of anti-government demonstrations; column (2) the change in the number of riots; column (3) the change in the Political Risk Service 
Expropriation score (the score is re-scaled so that higher values denote a higher risk of expropriation); column (4) and (5) and indicator variable that 
is equal to unity if the country experienced a civil conflict. The explanatory variable is the log-change in the food price index. *Significantly different 
from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
17Table 8. Robustness Check III: Food Price Effects in Middle and High Income Countries
                      Demonstrations     Riots                 Expropriation                            Civil Conflict             
Panel A: High Income Countries











Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries 1357 1357 670 1414 1414
Observations 34 34 33 34 34
Panel B: Middle Income Countries











FoodPI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fe 1046 1046 488 1060 1060
Countries 26 26 25 26 26
Note: The method of estimation in column (1)-(4) is least squares; column (5) maximum likelihood. t-values shown in parentheses below the point 
estimates are based on Huber robust standard errors that are clustered at the country level. The dependent variable in column (1) is the change in the 
number of anti-government demonstrations; column (2) the change in the number of riots; column (3) the change in the Political Risk Service 
Expropriation score (the score is re-scaled so that higher values denote a higher risk of expropriation); column (4) and (5) and indicator variable that 
is equal to unity if the country experienced a civil conflict. The explanatory variable is the log-change in the food price index. *Significantly different 
from zero at 90 percent confidence, ** 95 percent confidence, *** 99 percent confidence.
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